expense of an entirely different product.
At issue is whether an individual retailer's reservation profit, defined as the profit a retailer can earn by selling its most profitable alternative to the manufacturer's product, depends on the manufacturer's contract terms. If it does not, because the retailer's most profitable alternative is not a demand-side substitute for the manufacturer's product, the manufacturer can maximize its profit either by choosing a wholesale price to induce its desired retail price and employing a lumpsum transfer to divide the surplus (two-part pricing), or by controlling the retail price directly and dividing the surplus with its wholesale price (resale price maintenance). On the other hand, if a retailer's most profitable alternative is a demand-side substitute for the manufacturer's product, the manufacturer's profit maximizing choice of contract turns on whether, in the absence of RPM, the equilibrium retail price of its product would rise or fall if a single retailer were to drop its product and instead sell a competing brand. If the equilibrium retail price would rise, the manufacturer strictly prefers its profit maximizing RPM contract over all two-part pricing contracts.
A manufacturer can use RPM to prevent a retailer's dropping of its product from causing the retail price for the same good at other stores to rise. Since the retailer's profit from selling its alternative offering is increasing in the price of the manufacturer's product at other stores, such a strategy renders the retailer's alternative offering less profitable. The manufacturer is thus able to appropriate more surplus from each retailer without causing its product to be dropped. In a linear demand example with two downstream firms, I show that RPM leads to lower equilibrium retail prices when the distribution density remains constant, and higher equilibrium retail prices when the distribution density increases, vis a via two-part pricing. The manufacturer's RPM contract may entail either fixing the retail price or specifying a price floor.
The notion that a manufacturer might employ RPM to achieve its desired distribution density was first conjectured by Gould and Preston (1965) . Subsequent formalization of this idea (Mathewson and Winter (1983b); Bittlingmayer (1983); Gallini and Winter (1983) ; Perry and Groff (1985) ) models RPM as a solution to the vertical control problem of a manufacturer selling to a downstream industry in which retailers incur fixed-set up costs to enter and their number is determined by a zero-profit condition. This explanation for RPM is not convincing, however, because two-part pricing is also a solution to the same vertical control problem. In effect, assuming that retailers incur fixed set-up costs to enter the downstream market is formally equivalent to assuming they have an opportunity cost of shelf space independent of the products being examined, i.e. that each retailer's most profitable alternative to the manufacturer's product is not a demand-side substitute.
If retailers' opportunity costs of shelf space are endogenized, as in this article, the equivalence of RPM and two-part pricing disappears.
That the qualitative insights for RPM are significantly different when retailer reservation profits are endogenous has been noted in a complementary analysis by Perry and Besanko (1991) . They find that RPM can be strictly preferred to two-part pricing in a model in which upstream firm compete for retailer patronage and the number of downstream firms is large. However, for simplicity, they assume the retail price of a product is independent of the number of retailers selling it and thus the reservation profit squeeze motive for RPM does not arise in their model. Shaffer (1991) provides an equilibrium analysis of RPM and slotting allowances in the context of shelf space rivalry when retailers have monopsony power and manufacturers produce homogeneous goods. Because the upstream firms lack market power, however, there is no conflict within the vertical structure over the distribution of surplus. Slotting allowances and RPM in that model arise solely for strategic reasons to mitigate the downstream pricing externality.
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. After presenting the model and notation, section 2 discusses the benchmark case in which retailers' reservation profits are exogenous. Section 3 demonstrates that the equivalence of RPM and two-part pricing disappears when retailers' reservation profits are endogenous. Section 4 illustrates the results in a linear demand example and section 6 concludes. Retailer i's reservation profit, or opportunity cost of shelf space, is defined as the profit retailer i can earn if instead of selling the manufacturer's product, it sells its most profitable alternative.
For the remainder of this section, I assume this alternative offering is not a demand-side substitute for product A and hence that retailer i's reservation profit, denoted SS, can be taken as exogenous.
To obtain distribution, the manufacturer must ensure that the retailer i earns at least this amount.
It is useful to begin by establishing, as a benchmark, the profit that a vertically integrated firm can earn if it sells its product at both retail stores and rents shelf space at a cost of SS. Define Solving yields P = P', and w = to such that (PI -si)DA(PI) = SS, for a maximized profit of III.
If the manufacturer does not specify the retail price, its problem is
Solving yields w = w r such that PA(wI) = PI, and (1993)). In the next section, I show that endogenizing retailers' reservation profits will also engender instances in which RPM yields strictly higher profit than two-part pricing.
Endogenous Reservation Profit
Suppose reservation profits now depend on the manufacturer's contract terms in the sense that each retailer's most profitable alternative, product B, is a demand-side substitute for product A. If retailer 1 sells product B and retailer 2 sells product A, retailer l's profit is given by iB A = (P, -cb)DB A(P, P2) and retailer 2's profit is given by sB A = (P2 -w)DB.A(P , P 2 ) -P. Assume that rWA is concave in P, and that |82rBA/8P2 > 0 2 aA/ 8 Ps 8 P;, so there is a unique Nash equilibrium price vector denoted by (PA(cI,w), P 2 (cb, w)). As long as both retailers make strictly positive sales, it can be verified that retailer 2's price is increasing in w.
Define a retailer's reservation profit when both retailers sell product A as the maximized profit it would earn if it unilaterally dropped product A and instead sold product B. These profits for retailers 1 and 2 are
and HItsB(P 1 ) = max (P 2 -c)Dz 'B(P 1 , P 2 ).
Using the envelope theorem, and assuming both retailers make positive sales, each retailer's reser- (1)
Let (w, F-) denote the profit maximizing wholesale price and fixed fee. Since the constraints bind at F-, the manufacturer's maximized profit with two-part pricing can be written as
Assuming both retailers make positive sales in the event one retailer sells product A and the other retailer sells product B, reservation profits are increasing in the manufacturer's wholesale price. The greater is the manufacturer's wholesale price, the greater is the corresponding Nash equilibrium retail price of its product, and hence the greater is each retailer's reservation profit. It follows that w-< w l , implying that P A(w") < P A(a,) = PI. That is, the induced equilibrium retail price when both retailers sell product A is strictly less than the retail price that would be chosen by a vertically integrated firm. The reason is that at w = w', a small decrease in the wholesale price has only a second order effect on joint profit, but a negative first order effect on each retailer's reservation profit. Hence, for a small decrease away from w', the manufacturer's share of maximized joint profit necessarily increases.'
If PB "A and PiA were somehow fixed, and hence each retailer's reservation profit were fixed, the manufacturer could increase its profit by increasing its wholesale price to w . On the other hand, if PA were somehow fixed, and hence joint profit were fixed, the manufacturer could increase its profit by decreasing its wholesale price, thereby reducing each retailer's reservation profit. It is this inherent tension in setting the wholesale price when the manufacturer induces both retailers to sell its product and does not restrict the retail price that suggests a possible role for RPM.
If the manufacturer chooses to constrain retailers' independent pricing, it has three choices of contract type. It can fix the retail price at P (fixed-price RPM), specify a price floor at P (min RPM), or specify a price ceiling at P (max RPM). In the first case, retailers that sell product A have no pricing discretion. They must charge P 1 = P 2 = P. In the second (third) case, retailers that sell product A must charge a price greater (less) than or equal to P. This gives rise to several possibilities. First, the price restraint can be superfluous in the sense that it has no effect on retail prices. Second, the price restraint may affect retail prices if both retailers sell product A but not if only one retailer sells product A. Third, the price restraint may affect retail prices if only one retailer sells product A, but not if both retailers sell product A. Finally, the price restraint may bind whether or not both retailers sell product A. The following lemma simplifies the analysis.
lemma I There does not exist a min or max RPM contract that induces both retailers to sell product A and yields strictly higher profit than in all two-part pricing and fixed-price RPM contracts.
Proof: See appendix A.
Lemma 1 ensures there is no loss of generality in restricting attention to a comparison of Hij,
with the maximum profit available from a fixed-price RPM contract when the manufacturer induces both retailers to sell its product. The fixed-price RPM maximization problem is Let (P, w) denote the profit maximizing retail and wholesale price. Since the wholesale price is chosen such that the constraints bind, the manufacturer's maximised profit can be written as
Assuming both retailers make positive sales in the event one retailer sells product A and the other retailer sells product B, reservation profits are increasing in product A's fixed retail price.
It follows that P < P1 for the same reason that the induced retail price with two-part pricing is strictly less than the retail price that would be chosen by a vertically integrated firm.6 If each retailer's reservation profit were fixed, the manufacturer could increase its profit by increasing its retail price to P 1 . On the other hand, if joint profit were fixed, the manufacturer could increase its profit by decreasing its retail price, thereby reducing each retailer's reservation profit.
Comparing Two-Part Pricing and Resale Price Maintenance
When retailers' reservation profits are endogenous, an additional target of control is introduced.
Not only is the manufacturer concerned with its distribution density and retail price in equilibrium,
it is also concerned with what its retail price would be if one of the retailers were to drop its product.
One might think that fixed-price RPM necessarily yields strictly higher profit than two-part pricing in this situation, since it provides a means to control retail prices directly. However, fixed-price RPM also adds the constraint that the retail price is constant across product market configurations. It is not obvious, then, which will be the manufacturer preferred choice. In this section, I give sufficient conditions under which each type of contract is profit maximising.
The manufacturer's profit maximizing choice of contract if it induces both retailers to sell its product is determined by comparing ;,, and II. as given in (2) and (4). Notice that if the manufacturer fixes the retail price at PA(w-), joint profit with RPM is identical to joint profit with the manufacturer's profit maximising two-part pricing contract. Yet retailer reservation profits are strictly lower with the proposed RPM contract whenever an unconstrained retailer would raise the
price of product A if the rival retailer were to sell product B. Thus, if
the profit maximizing RPM contract enables the manufacturer to extract more surplus from each retailer without causing its product to be dropped.
Proposition 2 When retailers' reservation profits are endogenous, the manufacturer can sometimes earn strictly higher profit with fAzed-price RPM than with two-part pricing.
The intuition for why RPM sometimes yields strictly higher profit is straightforward: by preventing a retailer's dropping of product A from causing the rival store's price on product A to rise, the manufacturer renders a retailer's alternative product B less profitable. This is so because the maximum profit available from selling product B necessarily decreases the lower is the rival retailer's price on product A. Consequently, the manufacturer can increase its wholesale price to each retailer without causing its product to be dropped.
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Intuition suggests that RPM is more attractive the less differentiation there is between the two retailers and the more differentiation there is between the two products. In the polar case in which retailers are perfect substitutes and all of the differentiation is between products A and B, P^(W-) = w-< Ps A(cb, w-), and condition (5) is satisfied.
Note that RPM does not always arise in equilibrium; the manufacturer's profit maximizing two-part pricing contract sometimes yields strictly higher profit than in all RPM contracts for which the pricing constraint is binding. For instance, an RPM contract cannot be profitable for the manufacturer if at the wholesale price that would induce the profit maximizing retail price under RPM, an unconstrained retailer would decrease the price of the manufacturer's product were the rival retailer to drop it and instead sell a competing good. Constraining the retail price in this instance would render a retailer's alternative product more profitable and consequently the manufacturer would be able to appropriate less surplus from each retailer than it could in the absence of RPM.s
Comparing Alternative Forms of Resale Price Maintenance
To determine the manufacturer's profit maximizing contract, the preceding subsection compared the manufacturer's profit maximizing two-part pricing contract with its profit maximizing fixedprice RPM contract. In this subsection, I focus on situations in which this form of RPM yields strictly higher profit, i.e. II,,. 5II,,, and ask whether other forms of RPM can also maximize the manufacturer's profit. In short, the answer is yes, with some qualification. fixed-price P with a price ceiling at P yields strictly higher profit. Q.E.D.
The intuition for proposition 3 is that fixed-price RPM is strictly preferred to all min and max RPM contracts if and only if the manufacturer must prevent retailers from selling below P when both retailers are selling product A, and yet at the same time, prevent retailer 2 from selling above Assume that aggregate utility is given by
where M is aggregate income, 7 > 0 is a demand substitution parameter, a > 0 is a measure of product asymmetry, and q is the quantity consumed of the ith product, i = A, B. In the event both retailers sell product A, q = 0, and the demand facing the manufacturer is given by
where PA = min (P, P2). In the event only retailer 2 sells good A, the demand system can be found by differentiating U with respect to quantity and inverting to obtain Figure 1 illustrates the manufacturer's maximized profit if it were to sell to one retailer, to both retailers with two-part pricing, or to both retailers with RPM. For y < 1.8, the manufacturer maximizes its profit by selling to one retailer. In this region, II,> IT > llf. For 1.8 < 7 < 5.1, the manufacturer maximizes its profit by selling to both retailers if RPM is feasible, and to one retailer if RPM is not feasible. In this region, IM > 11it> II11. Finally, for y > 5.1, the manufacturer maximizes its profit by selling to both retailers regardless of whether RPM is feasible.
In this region, IIM > IM > I11.
Insert figure 1
When the manufacturer sells to both retailers, it always prefers to use RPM. This is a consequence of the assumption that all of the differentiation is between products A and B. The percentage increase in profit with RPM vis a vis two-part pricing varies from 0% at y = 1.8, to 23.2% at 7 = 5.1, to 14.6% at 7 = 10. It may seem surprising that the manufacturer would ever want to sell to both retailers, given they are undifferentiated. Yet, by doing so, the manufacturer can avoid direct price competition with product B and realize a gain which is larger the more substitutable are A and B. Figure 2 illustrates the effect of RPM on equilibrium retail prices in the region 1.8 < < 10.
Retail Profits and Prices
Throughout this region, RPM yields strictly higher profit for the manufacturer than two-part pricing. For 7 < 5.1, the effect of RPM is to increase the distribution density and to raise retail prices vis a vis what they would be with two-part pricing.
Insert figure 2.
By selling to both retailers, the manufacturer avoids direct price competition with product B and is therefore less constrained in raising prices. The result is higher retail prices and, since < P 1 , higher joint industry profits as well. Moreover, each retailer is better off with RPM since reservation profits necessarily increase with the higher retail prices. Thus, for y < 5.1, the reservation profit squeeze motive for RPM is consistent with the observed behavior of those manufacturers and retailers who lobbied in favor of legislation for RPM during its early history. If lemma 1 is false, at least one min or max RPM contract exists that induces both retailers to sell product A and yields strictly higher profit than all two-part pricing and fixed-price RPM contracts. Without loss of generality, let w* denote the wholesale price in such a contract, and consider either a price floor or ceiling at P". There are three cases to consider.
Case 1: P' > pA(w*), pB'A(c, w") or P* < PA(w*), PB'"(c, w'). In this case, the price restraint either always binds or never binds. If it binds, a fixed-price RPM contract at (w', P*) yields identical profit. If it never binds, a two-part pricing contract with wholesale price at w* and no lump-sum transfer yields identical profit. Hence, the existence of a min or max RPM contract that violates lemma 1 cannot arise in this case. 
Comparing (8) and (9), it is seen that joint profits are strictly higher and retailers' reservation profits are strictly lower in (9). Profit in (9) is thus strictly higher than in (8) and hence the existence of a max RPM contract that violates lemma 1 cannot arise in this case.
Case 3: P 'A(c, w*) > P* > PA(w*)
In this case, the maximum profit that can be obtained with min RPM while still inducing both retailers to sell product A is given by (8). By contrast, the maximum profit that can be obtained
By contrast, the maximum profit that can be obtained with two-part pricing when w = w* is
2 (P' -c)DA(P*) -B'A(P*)I.
(10)
Comparing (6) and (7), it is seen that (7) yields strictly higher profit since joint profit is the same under the two contracts, and retailers' reservation profits are strictly higher with min RPM. Hence, the existence of a min RPM contract that violates lemma 1 cannot arise in this case.
The maximum profit that can be obtained with max RPM while still inducing both retailers to Comparing (8) and (10), it is seen that (10) yields strictly higher profit since joint profit is the same under the two contracts, and retailers' reservation profits are strictly higher with min RPM.
Hence, the existence of a min RPM contract that violates lemma 1 cannot arise in this case.
The maximum profit that can be obtained with max RPM while still inducing both retailers to sell product A is given by (6). Comparing (6) and (10), it is seen that retailers' reservation profits are the same in the two contracts. However, if PI > P', joint profits are strictly lower with max RPM and hence profit in (10) is strictly higher than in (6).
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On the other hand, if PI< P*, the manufacturer can improve on (6) by choosing a fixed-price RPM contract at P = PI. The maximum profit that can be obtained with such a contract while still inducing both retailers to sell product A is
Comparing (6) and (11), it is seen that joint profits are strictly higher and retailers' reservation profits are strictly lower in (11). Profit in (11) is thus strictly higher than in (6) and hence the existence of a max RPM contract that violates lemma 1 cannot arise in this case. Case 1: P'> PA(w*), PB'4(c, w*) or P' < P A(w*), Pz A(c,w *). In this case, the price restraint either always binds or never binds. If it never binds, a two-part pricing contract with wholesale price at s' and no lump-sum transfer yields identical profit and thus is necessarily less than IITIf it binds, a fixed-price RPM contract at (w*, P*) yields identical profit. By the definition of Ui and 1, however, unless w* = 1 and P* = P, there exists a fixed-price RPM contract that yields strictly higher profit. But if w* = -and P* = P, the conditions of lemma 2 are satisfied. Hence, there does not exist a min or max RPM contract that violates lemma 2 in this case.
Cases 2 and 3, the same as in appendix A, can also be ruled out, since, as shown above, all min and max RPM contracts in these cases yield profit strictly less than max{Tfm,"1;j. Thus, since 3. See Overstreet (1983) and Bowman (1955) for examples of products that were price maintained prior to RPM's prohibition in 1975. Since then numerous FTC cases and private antitrust suits have alleged RPM. Ippolito (1988) has compiled a list of these products.
4. Once the retail price is specified, the manufacturer has an extra instrument with which to extract surplus. It can set w = 0 and extract surplus with a fixed fee only, it can set F = 0 and extract surplus with the wholesale price only, or it can extract surplus with a combination of the two instruments. In this article, I follow the convention that when there is a redundancy between the wholesale price and fixed fee, the manufacturer uses only its wholesale price to extract retail surplus. Such a convention simplifies the exposition.
5. Formally, this can be shown by substituting the inequality constraints into the objective function in (1), writing out the first order condition with respect to w and then verifying it is negative when evaluated at P1.
6. Formally, P < P1 is established by substituting the inequality constraints into the objective function in (3), writing out the first order condition with respect to P and then verifying it is negative when evaluated at P
.
7. Perry and Besanko (1991) also examine a model in which reservation profits are endogenous. ---p(. )
